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Abstract
How does inequality motivate people and at what cost? We develop a model of perpet-
ual youth with heterogeneous upward-looking aspirations – people value their consump-
tion relative to the conditional mean of those above them in the distribution. Their survival
depends on health capital produced from time investment and health goods. Higher fun-
damental inequality, working through the aspirations gap, motivates people to work and
save more. Economic outcomes improve but income and consumption inequality worsen
because the poor have less capacity to respond. By diverting resources from health produc-
tion, aspirations also worsen mortality, especially for the poor. Though relative income has
a strong negative effect on personal health, we show that inequality has a weaker effect on
population health, explaining an empirical puzzle on the relative income and health gradi-
ent.
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1 Introduction
We often care about inequality not for its functional consequences alone, but directly, because
of what it means for our relative position in society. This may be due to rivalry with others who
are doing economically better, ego rents from being viewed as more successful, or the informa-
tion that relative position reveals about what it takes to succeed. Positional concerns, in turn,
affect our well-being. If they motivate us to work harder or invest in the future, our economic
lives may improve. Conversely, personal health may decline if a loss of social status triggers a
behavioral change or biochemical response from stress, feelings of inadequacy and failure.
This paper deals with how inequality motivates people and at what cost. The idea that in-
equality can be motivating is most widely associated with Friedman (1962) and underlies Okun’s
(1975) influential work on the equity-efficiency tradeoff. It has gained currency in policy circles
yet received little systematic treatment in the academic literature. When inequality motivates
the rich as well as the poor through aspirations, we show that equilibrium inequality may well
worsen. The very different view, that inequality is costly because it directly and adversely affects
health, originates with the work of Marmot (1986), Elstad (1998) and especially Wilkinson (1992,
1996) in the social epidemiology and public health literatures. This relative income gradient has
been the subject of vigorous debate and conflicting evidence. We identify a behavioral channel
through which relative position aggravates personal health. We then illustrate how this explains
the weak aggregate relationship between inequality and population health in the data.
Our framework is a life-cycle economy with heterogeneous ability and upward-looking aspi-
rations. People pursue the consumption standards of those who are better off than them. In an
effort to catch up, they work more (higher present consumption) and save more (higher future
consumption). How motivated they are to do so depends on how far they fall below their aspi-
rations: the poor face a larger aspirations gap and respond more to relative position. Inequality,
independently of absolute income, has a first-order welfare effect in this environment. Since
the poor are already extended on the labor market, they have less room to raise labor supply.
Despite perfect capital and insurance markets, this limited capacity worsens consumption and
income inequality even as everyone is economically better off from aspirations.
Aspirations have health consequences too. An individual’s survival rate depends on health
capital produced from time investment and complementary health goods, a synthesis of Blan-
chard (1985) and Yaari (1965) with Grossman (1972a). Stepping up labor supply comes at the
cost of less discretionary time available for health production.1 Likewise the greater emphasis
on consumption and saving means a lower propensity to spend on health goods. Therefore,
1One should interpret this response generally, not just working longer hours but also taking on multiple jobs or
branching into occupations that compensate better but have harsher work environments.
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higher relative deprivation – a bigger shortfall from the aspirational level of consumption – due
to higher fundamental inequality lowers life expectancy. Health production suffers across the
distribution, more so among the poor who are worse off in relative terms.
This link between inequality and health marks the first contribution of our paper as it re-
solves an empirical puzzle – the conflicting micro- and macro-level evidence on health and in-
equality. Social epidemiologists such as Wilkinson (1992, 1996) often cite evidence on mortality
and income inequality in the OECD to claim that, distinct from the effect of absolute income
on health, income inequality itself has a first-order negative effect on individual and population
health. This and similar claims on the relative income gradient based on aggregate statistics are
not robust to careful empirical analysis; the negative correlation between inequality and pop-
ulation health is weak at best. Disaggregated data, nonetheless, paint a clearer and compelling
picture. Relative position in society and measures of relative deprivation are found to consis-
tently and negatively predict household health, controlling for absolute income.
In our model it is because households strongly respond to inequality under aspirations that
the aggregate relationship between inequality and health is weak. Aspiration lowers the marginal
propensity of health investment – income gains are disproportionately allocated towards con-
sumption spending and wealth accumulation – thereby flattening the gradient between aggre-
gate health and income. A mean preserving spread in household income, that is higher in-
equality, has a smaller negative effect on aggregate health because of this. Other factors such as
economic growth and medical innovations also weaken the aggregate relationship over time as
they relax constraints on health investment in poorer households.2 In other words, the absence
of a strong relationship between inequality and population health should not be taken to imply
that inequality has no direct and adverse health effects. We conclude that if we care about the
social cost of inequality, aggregate measures like population life expectancy are less informative
than distributional measures such as the life expectancy gap or the Gini.
The second contribution of this paper is to further our understanding of aspirations and
inequality beyond the naïve Friedman-Okun hypothesis. Much of the existing “Keeping Up
with the Jones” (KUWJ) literature focuses on representative agents who aspire to one common
standard of living, for instance, the average consumption or wealth level. Under this common
aspiration there is no scope to identify differential effects across the distribution or to study the
effect of aspirations on equilibrium inequality. In our model, not just the poor, the rich too are
motivated by upward-looking aspirations. This introduces two additional margins. The ability
of the rich to more strongly respond to aspirations through labor and capital supply ends up
2The model deals with an observable behavioral response to aspirations and inequality. It does not formalize,
in particular, the biochemical pathways that link loss of self-esteem and social status to ill health.
Nothing in our analysis suggests that relative income is a stronger determinant of health compared to absolute
income. In fact it is because of the latter than economic growth undoes the adverse health effects of inequality.
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worsening economic inequality. Moreover, keeping up with aspirations diverts time and finan-
cial resources from health production among the poor. The resulting higher mortality lowers
their marginal value of consumption, weakens their incentive to catch up. The tendency for the
consumption and income distributions to further worsen is counteracted by the luxury good
nature of health spending.
A third contribution of this paper is methodological. To the best of our knowledge this is
the first paper to analyze a Ramsey-type economy with endogenous and heterogeneous aspi-
rations. The analytical complexity of this framework is resolved through quantitative work fo-
cused on the stationary distribution. We build on the consumption-based common-aspirations
literature, including Abel (1990), Gali (1994), de la Croix and Michel (1999), Alonso-Carrera et
al. (2005, 2007), García-Peñalosa and Turnovksy (2008) and Barnett et al. (2010).3 That as-
pirations are formed with respect to consumption in this paper implicitly assumes that some
forms of spending like housing, cars, schools are informative about a household’s living stan-
dards and generate envy among its neighbors and social circle.4 Among more recent works,
Genicot and Ray (2010) provide a helpful typology of social aspirations and show how common
and stratified aspirations over a dynasty’s future consumption lead to long-run polarization;
see also Bogliacino and Ortoleva (2011). Both papers use a logistic specification for the utility
loss from aspirations failure. We rely, instead, on a concave specification and there is no po-
larization. Our work is also related to the broader literature on preference externalities, recent
contributions in which include Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012), Corneo and Jeanne (1998),
Kawamoto (2009), and Moav and Neeman (2010).5
The next section discusses the evidence on relative income and health and analyzes a static
model to illustrate how aspirations can explain the data. Section 3 presents a more general
dynamic model and studies the individual’s decision problem. Using quantitative work, Section
4 digs deeper into aspirations, health and inequality at the individual and aggregate levels. We
conclude in Section 5.
3García-Peñalosa and Turnovksy (2008) study heterogeneous aspirations in the Ramsey model to identify a pref-
erence specification for which the aggregate behavior does not depend on the distribution of aspirations. The
aspirations, however, are posited to be exogenous individual-specific proportions of mean consumption.
4In the model distributional rank in and of itself is not valued by individuals for the simple reason that rank is
hard to ascertain and value unless it leads to observable outcomes. In other words, people care about their relative
position only to the extent that it reveals something about their relative standard of living, consumption being one
measure. See also footnote 10.
5Some in this literature use relative wealth or income or a signaling good to model status seeking.
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2 Evidence and Theory
2.1 An Empirical Puzzle
A central theme in the literature on public health and epidemiology is the health effect of in-
equality – the relative income gradient – that operates independently of the absolute income
gradient that economists typically study. This focus owes much to the work of the social epi-
demiologist Richard G. Wilkinson who in a series of papers and monographs (Wilkinson, 1992,
1996, Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) has advanced the hypothesis that inequality has an adverse
effect on individual and population health because of psycho-social causes, that inequality is,
in and of itself, a health hazard (Deaton, 2001)
There is no correlation between life expectancy and GDP per capita across the OECD, for
example, but a distinct negative relationship between life expectancy and inequality (Wilkin-
son, 1996) and a positive relationship between gains in life expectancy and gains in the income
share of the poorest 60% (Wilkinson, 1992). The aggregate evidence is interpreted causally.
Specifically, it is argued that social circumstances such as loss of self esteem, balance between
work and home or loss of control over one’s life in more unequal societies trigger behavioral
and bio-chemical responses that heighten the risk of heart disease, cancers and other ailments.
The particular psycho-social pathways are identified from other studies. Biologist Robert M.
Sapolosky’s work on primates is frequently cited as illustrating how social dominance, over
time, causes physiological responses that can permanently elevate health hazard in humans
(Wilkinson, 1996, ch 10). Similarly the Whitehall studies on British civil servants have found a
strong inverse correlation between position in the administrative hierarchy and mortality rate.
Mortality rate for men in the lowest administrative grade was three times higher than that for
men in the highest grade, only a third of which is explained by the effect of income on health
choices, the remainder presumably through the direct effect of relative position or inequality
(Marmot, 1986, Smith et al., 1990, Wilkinson and Pikett, 2009).6
The “Wilkinson hypothesis” has fundamentally influenced the public health debate on how
to address health inequalities (Subramanian and Karachi, 2004). But barring notable excep-
tions such as Deaton (2001) and Eibner and Evans (2005), it has received little attention from
economists researching health and inequality. A primary concern is surely identification, par-
ticularly when working with aggregate statistics. Setting that aside, for a compelling case would
require a natural experiment that alters relative income while preserving own income, several
6Not all of the evidence Wilkinson cites neatly fit this mold. For example the negative effect of unemployment
(Wilkinson, 1996, pp. 177-178) or natural disasters (p. 180) on subsequent mortality can be easily understood
through the conventional income channel. Partly because of this, and partly because an economic model has little
to say about automated biochemical responses to relative position, we focus exclusively on behavioral responses,
the social half of Wilkinson’s psycho-social hypothesis.
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other concerns have been voiced. First, Wilkinson’s assertion of causality based on the aggre-
gate data has been questioned right from the beginning. Suppose that the survival rate is deter-
mined by household income through a positive and concave gradient. By Jensen’s inequality,
a mean-preserving increase in income dispersion would worsen a poorer household’s health
more than it improves a richer household’s, that is, average or population health would worsen.
Gravelle (1998), therefore, questions whether a negative correlation between measures of in-
equality and aggregate health says anything about causality. More pointedly, a negative corre-
lation is entirely consistent with the absolute income and health gradient.
A second problem is the robustness of the evidence. Judge (1995) reports that Wilkinson’s
original findings do not hold up to subsequent data and more careful methodology. While Ka-
plan et al. (1996) and Kennedy et al. (1996) find a similar negative relationship between health
and inequality at the aggregate level for the US, it is sensitive to the southern States: the cor-
relation weakens for white mortality alone (Deaton, 2003). There is indication too that the ag-
gregate relationship has weakened over time across the OECD. Table 1 reports – pooled over
time and countries – correlations between inequality (Gini coefficient) and life expectancy (at
birth).7 The negative association is clearly weaker in the latter period. This finding is robust to
Full Sample Before 2000 After 2000
Gini −9.386∗∗ −13.167∗∗∗ −8.831∗∗
(-2.486) (-2.853) (-1.993)
Full Sample Before 2000 After 2000
Gini −9.234∗∗ −13.791∗∗∗ −7.302∗
(-2.477) (-3.0179) (-1.735)
GDP Growth −0.167 0.055 −0.391∗∗∗
(-1.637) (0.425) (-3.555)
Full Sample Before 2000 After 2000
Gini −7.370∗∗ −12.928∗∗∗ −8.393∗∗
(-2.058) (-2.862) (-8.393)
Mean GDP Growth −0.308∗ 0.135 −0.662∗∗∗
(-1.932) (0.573) (-4.012)
t-stat in Parentheses. Significance: ***: 1%, **:5%, *:10%
Table 1: Data: Life Expectancy and Inequality
splitting the sample at 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. Surveying a large body of research that
has emerged since Wilkinson’s original work, Subramanian and Kawachi (2004) report that the
7Gini data come from the OECD, CIA World Fact Book and the Deininger and Squire Dataset. Life expectancy
and income data covering 1974-2010 are from the OECD.
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negative relationship between population health and income is not robust and requires further,
more careful work. We conclude that the overall pattern is a weakly negative correlation at best.
Yet the disaggregated evidence is clearer: inequality – as measured by relative position or
deprivation – has a strong negative effect on individual and household-level health. Besides the
studies on relative social position mentioned earlier (and the sources they cite), Deaton (2001)
finds that an increase in Yitzhaki’s (1979) measure of relative income deprivation within the
US states results in worse reported health. Eibner and Evans (2005) confirm this finding for a
larger range of health outcomes including mortality and alternative measures of the reference
group used for the deprivation index. Relative deprivation has a particularly large impact on
deaths related to smoking and coronary heart diseases which are known to be associated with
long-term stress and excessive work. Both studies control for household income, that is, they
identify a mechanism working separately from the direct effect household income has on health
production; see also Subramanyam et al. (2009). Studies have replicated these findings for other
populations, Dahl et al. (2006) for Norway and Kondo et al. (2008) for Japan, for instance.8
This seeming contradiction between aggregate and disaggregate data is puzzling. Under-
standing it is important not just for our grasp of health behavior and policy – is income growth
alone enough to lift the poor out of poverty and ill health? should we redistribute income or
directly tackle health inequality? – but also since much research has come to view aggregate
measures of health such as life expectancy or infant mortality as good proxies for the social
consequences of inequality, a topic that has emerged to the forefront of public and intellectual
discourse in recent years.
2.2 A Resolution
What kind of theory do we need to explain the data? The one we advance relies on preference
externalities in the form of consumption-based aspirations.
Could a model without such externalities explain the evidence? Take the most obvious
benchmark, a partial-equilibrium Grossman-Yaari-Blanchard longevity model where there is
no consumption externality, markets are perfect and prices exogenous; this is nested by our
specification. Since each household is autarkic, relative position in the distribution has an ef-
fect on household health only to the extent it is informative about the household’s absolute
income. Controlling for household income, we would expect relative position to have little, if
8This is not to say that all studies find evidence in favor of the relative income gradient. In Miller and Paxson
(2006), having wealthier neighbors does not aggravate mortality controlling for own income. It is unclear, though,
if that necessarily negates the Wilkinson effect. If crime is lower in wealthier neighborhoods and the effect is
strong, it may dominate the adverse relative income channel. Likewise it is hard to adequately control for selection,
individuals choosing to locate in wealthier versus poorer neighborhoods.
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any, effect on household health. As long as rich and poor households face the same prices, en-
dogenous factor prices do not negate this prediction. In other words, such a model would have
a hard time explaining the strong micro-level evidence on the relative income gradient. At the
macro level, on the other hand, the model would predict a non-causal negative, possibly strong,
association between population health and inequality. In other words, the model would not fit
the macro evidence either.
Take a different alternative, one that departs from the neoclassical paradigm without intro-
ducing consumption externalities and where relative position in the distribution has a direct
bearing on health production. This may be due to, among several factors, credit frictions (Ga-
lor and Zeira, 1992), human capital externalities (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997), complementarity
between survival and asset accumulation (Chakraborty and Das, 2005) or access to heath care
(Gulati and Ray, 2014). Although not all these papers or related ones in the inequality literature
directly study health, there are certain commonalities in why relative position matters: poorer
households face different relative prices or expected returns (first three papers) or they face a
different health production function (last paper). Whatever be the exact mechanism, inequality
has a strongly negative causal effect on household and aggregate health in this literature. Here
the drawback is the inability to match the macro evidence.9
How does preference externality help? In our model, households aspire to the average con-
sumption level of everyone above them in the distribution. Since poorer households face a
larger aspirations gap – a higher relative consumption deprivation – their marginal propensity
to invest in health is considerably weaker than the health production function alone would
suggest. Redistributing income towards them, through a mean preserving spread, does little to
raise mean life expectancy. Paradoxically, it is because households are strongly motivated by
positional concerns that the aggregate relationship between inequality and health is weak or,
more precisely, weakly negative. An additional advantage of our framework is that we can use it
to study the relationship between aspirations and inequality more broadly, a topic we will turn
to later.
For now, consider a static model to gain some formal intuition. The decision-problem of a
household with assets a˜ is:
max
c,q,l
V (c, H ;C¯ )≡ψ(H)v(c,C¯ ) (1)
9Some of these papers also feature income polarization which accentuates these margins. Note also that in
Gulati and Ray (2014), the effect of inequality on the poor is non-monotonic at the neighborhood level: at low
levels of inequality, increasing the proportion or income of the rich improves provision of local goods like health.
This weakens the aggregate relationship but also predicts a positive effect of inequality on the health of the poor
as long as initial inequality is low.
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subject to
c+q =wl + a˜ (2)
H = f (q, l ) (3)
This is a special case of the steady state of the multi-period decision problem presented later.
Here ψ represents average lifespan of the household, v the utility flow from consumption per
year and V lifetime utility. Underlying the lifespan function is a survival function φ(H) that is
increasing and concave in the household’s health H . Sufficient concavity of the survival func-
tion is assumed so that the lifespan function is concave. It is because strong diminishing returns
in the survival function does not imply strong diminishing returns in the lifespan function that
health spending is a luxury good (below).
Utility from personal consumption c depends on the individual’s aspiration level C¯ . In other
words C¯ is a consumption benchmark that the individual aspires towards. We assume that
the marginal utility from personal consumption is increasing in it, that is, ∂(∂v/∂c)/∂C¯ > 0,
which means an increase in C¯ induces the individual to consume more in order to catch up
(Gali, 1994). It is through C¯ that relative position will affect household health and this operates
separately from the effect household income has on health production.
Two inputs go into the production of health, a health good q denominated in units of the
consumption good and healthy time that depends inversely on market labor supply l , with
∂ f /∂q > 0,∂ f /∂l < 0. Besides a˜, the household is endowed with a unit time endowment that is
allocated towards labor supply and health production. Note the tradeoff: higher health invest-
ment raises quantity of life ψ at the expense of quality of life v .
To make further progress suppose that
ψ(H)= 1+H
v(c,C¯ )= v + (c/C¯ )
1−σ
1−σ , σ> 1, v > 0
f (q, l )=Qq1−α(1− l )α, 0<α< 1.
The first identity follows from an underlying survival function φ(H) = H/(1+H) ∈ (0,1) with
expected lifetime given by ψ = 1/(1−φ). For the marginal utility from consumption to be in-
creasing in the aspirations level it is necessary that σ > 1. Implicitly we are normalizing utility
from death to zero and a sufficiently high, positive, value of v ensures that utility from being
alive is always positive. In addition a˜ > (1−α)w/α ensures that consumption is non-negative.
In an interior equilibrium – the only kind that we obtain in the dynamic general equilibrium
9
model later – the response of longevity ψ(H) to income and aspirations can be fully gauged
from the behavior of health expenditure q . The proposition below summarizes this; proofs are
available in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. The solution to the household’s optimization problem (1) subject to (2) and (3)
consists of
(i) A health investment function q(w) that is increasing and convex in labor income, q ′(w)>
0, q ′′(w)> 0;
(ii) Health outcomes H(w)=Q[α/(1−α)]αw−αq(w) andψ(H(w))= 1+H(w), both increasing
and concave in labor income; and
(iii) ∂q ′(w)/∂c¯ < 0.
The first result establishes that health expenditure is a luxury good; a similar result holds
with respect to household wealth a˜. Even so, the second result shows that health capital and
longevity are both concave in labor income, that is, the marginal return to health is diminish-
ing in income. The third result says that the marginal propensity to invest in health (MPIH) is
decreasing in the aspirations level C¯ . At low income levels, that is low w , the marginal product
of health investment is high. On the other hand, for a given C¯ , the aspirations gap C¯ /c is larger
and the marginal utility from personal consumption higher. Any income gain (higher w) is dis-
proportionately allocated towards consumption spending over health investment. An increase
in income therefore has a relatively small effect on a poorer household’s health. Put differently
the MPIH falls the poorer a household gets. This result is quite general and holds as long as as-
pirations are not directly based on health status.10 Since the lifespan function remains concave
in income, it is still the case that a mean preserving spread in income lowers average health.
That effect gets weaker the more responsive the household becomes to aspirations (see later)
and, not surprisingly, aggregate data may not systematically pick up a pronounced negative
relationship between the two.
An additional channel is at work. The puzzlement about the lack of a strong connection
between inequality and population health – causal or otherwise – stems from the premise that
10This also means that a direct preference over health as a consumption good can overturn these results if health
itself is a social good. We see little evidence of it among the poor and lower middle-class. Even among the well-
to-do, subgroups who socially signal their health and fitness goals are far from representative. Part of the problem
may be that unlike certain health outcomes (death, illness) and health choices (gym membership, diet fads), an
individual’s intrinsic health is not observed by others. It is also unclear whether some of these choices – crash diets
for example – actually improve health.
Alternatively, our results are overturned if consumption and health are strongly complementary; complemen-
tarity alone is not sufficient as equation (1) shows. We model health through mortality mainly because much, if
not the majority, of the empirical literature in this area uses mortality statistics.
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the aggregate health-income gradient is concave. As Hall and Jones (2007) have noted, and
Proposition 1(i) shows, health spending is a luxury good under standard preferences: it allows
one to enjoy life at the extensive margin (longevity) compared to the intensive margin (con-
sumption) which is subject to stronger diminishing returns as the household becomes wealth-
ier. This property also weakens the overall concavity between population health and income.
It will become clearer later that this, by itself, is not sufficiently strong to weaken the aggregate
relationship; upward-looking aspirations is essential. But it does play a role in how much health
amplifies fundamental inequality.
3 A Dynamic Model
The dynamic decision problem we present now allows for aspiration C¯ to be the equilibrium
outcome of consumption choices by all households and to vary across the distribution.
A discrete time infinitely-lived economy is populated by heterogeneous individuals (house-
holds) who potentially live forever. Time is indexed by t = 0,1, . . .∞. Individuals are born with
an idiosyncratic labor productivity draw θ, initial asset a0 and health capital H0. Every period
that he is alive, each individual has a unit time endowment that he allocates between work and
leisure.
3.1 Health Production
Much like the Grossman (1972a,b, 2000) model of health as an investment good, agents accu-
mulate a stock of health through purposeful investment that determines their longevity. Unlike
the Grossman model, they do not face a deterministic length of life that is dictated by a min-
imum health stock. Rather, the model builds on the perpetual youth framework from Yaari
(1965) and Blanchard (1985) in that the agent’s health capital at the beginning of any period
positively affects his probability of surviving to the next period.
Health capital depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0,1). For individual i the stock of health at the
beginning of t +1 depends on his undepreciated health capital and investment from period t :
Hi t+1 = (1−δ)Hi t + Ii t . (4)
Health investment, Ii t ≥ 0, is produced from the same two inputs as before. Healthy time allo-
cation, without loss of generality, is taken to be leisure time 1−li t , li t being i ’s labor supply. This
is a special case of Grossman’s model where leisure time can be purely consumed or devoted
to health production. Either way, the essential tradeoff is that raising consumption by increas-
ing labor supply comes at the cost of less discretionary time available for health production
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and worse health outcomes. The second input in Ii t is market-provided medical care or health
goods, qi t , such as visits to the doctor, drugs, vitamins, etc.. The relative price of this good is
unity, for example if q is produced using labor alone and a technology whose labor productivity
is normalized to unity. Gross health investment depends on these inputs according to
Ii t = I (li t , qi t ), (5)
an increasing and concave function of leisure and health expenditure satisfying I (1, q) = 0 =
I (l ,0). We use the same Cobb-Douglas specification as before, this time to health investment:
I (li t , qi t )=Q(1− li t )αqρi t , (6)
Q > 0 being productivity, α,ρ ∈ (0,1) and α+ρ ≤ 1.
The next step is to relate this health stock to agent’s i survival probability, φi t . This is deter-
mined by an increasing concave function
φi t =φ(Hi t ) (7)
that satisfies φ(H) = 0 for some H ≥ 0 and limH→∞φ(H) = 1 for t ≥ 1. Numerical simulations
later use the functional form
φ(Hi t )= ξ
(
1− ν
Hi t
)τ
, t ≥ 1 (8)
whose curvature is determined by τ ∈ (0,1), ν > 0 is a scaling parameter and H is restricted to
be above ν. To ensure that the agent is alive in the initial period t = 0, we assume that φi 0 = 1.
Sinceφi t+1 is the probability of being alive in t+1 conditional on being alive in t , the cumulative
probability of being alive until period t is11
Φi t =
t∏
n=0
φi n . (9)
Health capital has no effect on i ’s decision problem except through the survival rate. In other
words, health is not valued as a consumption good, nor does it directly affect i ’s productivity.
11Note that endogenous survival means that agents have different time horizons.
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3.2 Preferences
Utility in any period depends on personal consumption and leisure. As with the static model,
utility from consumption depends on relative position in the consumption distribution, a ver-
sion of the aspirations gap that is seen to motivate individual behavior (Genicot and Ray, 2010).
Specifically, agents have upward-looking aspirations: they care about how deprived they are
relative to those who are better off than themselves. This means their aspirational benchmark
is the average consumption of all individuals who consume at least as much as they do. Even
the highest-consumption agent is an aspirant, using his own consumption level to form that
aspiration. More concretely, individual i ’s aspirations level is given by
C¯i t =
∑N
j=11(c j t ≥ ci t )c j t∑N
j=11(c j t ≥ ci t )
(10)
where 1(c j t ≥ ci t ) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if true and 0 otherwise. It is
important to note that unlike much of the literature on status-seeking, aspirations levels here
are individual-specific.
To understand how the aspirations gap, or relative deprivation, C¯i /ci varies across the popu-
lation consider a hypothetical exogenous and continuous consumption distributionF (c). Here
C¯i =
∫∞
ci
xdF (x)/[1−F (ci )]. In general it is not possible to clearly sign ∂
(
C¯i /ci
)
/∂ci but con-
sider two examples commonly used in the inequality literature, Log Normal and Pareto. Figure
1 illustrates that C¯i /ci is monotonically decreasing in consumption level for Log Normal (left
panel). For Pareto (right panel), both rich and poor face the same aspirations gap. In both
cases, higher inequality implies a higher aspirations gap at all consumption levels. What is dif-
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Figure 1: Consumption Deprivation for Log Normal (left) and Pareto (right)F (c)
ferent in our model is that consumption inequality is the equilibrium outcome of an underlying
ability inequality. We show later that even for a Pareto distribution for ability, the equilibrium
consumption distribution behaves similar to the log Normal case. That is, the poor face a larger
aspiration gap than the rich and this will amplify the labor supply and wealth accumulation
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margins from the static model in section 2.
Individual i ’s preferences over consumption and leisure in period t when he is alive are
ui t ≡U (ci t ,C¯i t , li t )=
c1−σi t
1−σC¯
ψσ
i t +γ
(1− li t )1−σ
1−σ (11)
whereσ> 0 and 0<ψ< 1. This specification is similar to the macro KUWJ literature particularly
Gali (1994), though the consumption benchmark there is usually taken to be mean consump-
tion, same for all households. Forψ= (σ−1)/σwith σ> 1, the first component of (11) becomes(
ci t /C¯i t
)1−σ
/(1−σ) similar to Abel (1990) where the aspirations level is mean consumption.
Alpizar et al.’s (2005) survey-experimental evidence shows that relative consumption of non-
positional goods matters as much as positional goods; no distinction is made here between
the two. We do allow ψ 6= (σ−1)/σ which means σ > 1 is not necessary for an increase in C¯i t
to increase the marginal utility of consumption as long as ψ > 0. The quantitative results do,
however, use a value of σ above unity to be consistent with the macro evidence.12
A final point about the utility function. Note that when σ > 1, ui t < 0. To ensure that util-
ity from being alive always exceeds that from death, we normalize the latter to a large negative
number such that U < inf{U (ci t ,C¯i t , li t )}∞,Nt=0,i=1 . A complete specification of individual prefer-
ences is then
U (ci t ,C¯i t , li t )=

c1−σi t
1−σ C¯
ψσ
i t +γ (1−li t )
1−σ
1−σ , if agent i is alive
U , otherwise.
3.3 Decision Problem
Individual i ’s labor productivity θi is time invariant, drawn at the beginning of his life from the
distribution Γ(θ) with finite support. We assume that the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor
w is constant and exogenous. The return on investment R˜i t is individual-specific. Since indi-
viduals die over time, to ensure their assets are accounted for we assume a perfect annuities
market (Yaari, 1965). Under a perfectly competitive market, the zero profit condition implies
equilibrium annuitized investment return of R˜i t = R/φi t , R being the constant return on in-
vestment. Implicitly this assumes access to an international capital market where the borrow-
ing and lending rates are R−1. This in turn implies a constant aggregate capital-labor ratio from
a CRS technology, and constant wage per efficiency unit of labor.
12Yet another alternative for socially-minded behavior is for agents to directly care about inequality measures
such as the Gini coefficient or the Kuznet’s ratio. Those measures capture the whole distribution; it is unclear that
people care about those who are worse off then themselves in the same way they care about those who are doing
better. The former is usually labeled “pride” in the literature, the latter variously as “envy”, “status seeking” and
“upward-looking aspirations” (see Hopkins 2008 for a discussion of these alternatives).
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Individual i ’s period t budget constraint is
ci t +qi t +ai t+1 =wθi li t + R˜i t ai t , (12)
where a denotes his financial assets. He maximizes expected lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Φi t
{
c1−σi t
1−σC¯
ψσ
i t +γ
(1− li t )1−σ
1−σ
}
+ (1−Φi t )U
]
, (13)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount rate, subject to the health transition equation (4),
health production function (5), survival function (7), budget constraint (12), and the usual no-
Ponzi game condition, given θi and initial conditions (ai 0, Hi 0). To conserve notation we do
not explicitly distinguish between calendar time and age of the individual even though not all
individuals will be alive every period. We are now in a position to note how the static model of
section 2 was a special case of this dynamic setup. It assumedψ= (σ−1)/σ, β= 1, ξ= τ= ν= 1,
ρ = 1−α, δ = 1 and exogenous C¯ . The health scale was redefined there to start at zero and
each household was initially endowed with (1−φ)a˜/φ assets to simplify the algebra, by ignoring
the effect of health choice on the effective return on savings. Finally utility from death was
normalized to zero there which, for optimal decisions, is isomorphic to the assumption v =−U .
Reformulate the decision problem above as a dynamic programming problem. Differently
from the Ramsey model with homogeneous KUWJ preferences, the entire consumption and
wealth distributions, not just their means, matter for households’ choices here. Since individu-
als face idiosyncratic productivity and aspirations levels, two simplifying assumptions are made
to reduce computational time and impose a recursive structure. First, we assume that the in-
dividual takes into account how his health choices affect the annuity return R˜ that he receives.
The rationale for this is that people often purchase insurance based on actuarial tables.13 Sec-
ondly, we solve the household’s decision problem assuming the economy has reached the sta-
tionary distributions of health, wealth and consumption. Specifically we impose stationarity
of the consumption distribution, derive health and wealth dynamics consistent with that as-
sumption and then focus exclusively on the steady-state relationship between health, wealth
and aspirations.
Individual i faces four state variables (θi , ai t , Hi t ,C¯i t ) and three controls (ai t+1, li t , qi t ) and
13It has the computational advantage of reducing the state space since the annuity return does not have to be
considered part of it. In any case, computational results are very similar for price-taking behavior.
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his optimization decision is specified by the Bellman equation
V (θi t , ai t , Hi t ,C¯i t )= max
li t ,ai t+1,qi t
{
u
(
ci t ,C¯i t , li t
)+βφ (Hi t+1)V (θi t+1, ai t+1, Hi t+1,C¯i t+1)
+ β(1−φ (Hi t+1))U} , (14)
V being the value of being alive, subject to
ai t+1 =wtθi t li t + R
φ(Hi t )
ai t −qi t − ci t ,
Hi t+1 = (1−δ)Hi t +Q(1− li t )αqρi t ,
C¯i t+1 = C¯i t ,
θi t+1 = θi t = θi ,
(15)
given ai 0, Hi 0 and φi 0 = 1. The third constraint says that the consumption distribution is sta-
tionary. It becomes relevant only when we turn to the quantitative results in section 4 below.
3.4 Optimal Behavior
Consider the optimal choices of ai t+1, li t , and qi t that follow from the decision problem (14).
First take the consumption Euler equation implied by the choice of ai t+1:
ci t+1
ci t
= (βR) 1σ (C¯i t+1
C¯i t
)ψ
. (16)
Since the interest rate is exogenous, to ensure a stable invariant distribution we impose the
restriction
βR = 1 (A1)
under which the Euler equation simplifies to
ci t+1
ci t
=
(
C¯i t+1
C¯i t
)ψ
. (17)
This immediately implies that each individual’s consumption reaches steady state whenever
the aggregate consumption distribution is stationary as the individual’s relative position in the
consumption distribution remains unchanged over time. The perfect annuities market as-
sumption ensures that this is independent of the individual’s mortality rate.
16
Optimal choices for labor supply and health expenditure, li t and qi t , are
wθi c
−σ
i t C¯
ψσ
i t −γ(1− li t )−σ+β
∂Hi t+1
∂li t
[
φ′(Hi t+1){V (θi t+1, ai t+1, Hi t+1,C¯i t+1)−U }
+ φ(Hi t+1)V3(θi t+1, ai t+1, Hi t+1,C¯i t+1)
]≤ 0, (18)
and
−c−σi t C¯ψσi t +β
∂Hi t+1
∂qi t
[
φ′(Hi t+1){V (θi t+1, ai t+1, Hi t+1,C¯i t+1)−U }
+ φ(Hi t+1)V3(θi t+1, ai t+1, Hi t+1,C¯i t+1)
]≤ 0. (19)
respectively. Define
Ωi t+1 ≡φ′(Hi t+1)[V (θi t+1, ai t+1, Hi t+1,C¯i t+1)−U ]+φ(Hi t+1)V3(θi t+1, ai t+1, Hi t+1,C¯i t+1),
the common term in equations (18) and (19), using which it follows from (19) that
Ωi t+1 =
c−σi t C¯
ψσ
i t
β
[
∂Hi t+1/∂qi t
] . (20)
Substituting (20) into (18) yields:
(
C¯ψi t
ci t
)σ (
wθi + ∂Hi t+1/∂li t
∂Hi t+1/∂qi t
)
= γ(1− li t )−σ. (21)
To make further progress, take the parametric example from (6) using which equation (21) be-
comes:(
C¯ψi t
ci t
)σ
(1− li t )σ−1
(
wθi (1− li t )− α
ρ
qi t
)
= γ. (22)
To understand how aspirations affect the individual’s health consider a simple comparative
statics exercise. Suppose at the optimum governed by (22), individual i experiences an exoge-
nous increase in his aspiration level C¯i . How do health time investment and health expenditure
respond? Through the budget constraint, personal consumption is positively related to labor
supply, negatively to health expenditure. The remaining terms on the left-hand-side of (22), on
the other hand, depend negatively on labor supply and health expenditure. That is, the left-
hand-side of the equation is unambiguously decreasing in labor supply. When C¯i increases, an
increase in labor supply can restore equality to the first order condition. This means health time
investment, all else constant, will fall from an increase in aspirations.
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The effect on health expenditure, on the other hand, is ambiguous. It could either rise or fall
depending on the strength of the response through consumption (denominator) versus returns
to health expenditure (numerator). Recall, though, that health time and expenditures are com-
plementary inputs. Since health time investment falls unambiguously, there is another effect to
consider in the overall response to C¯i – returns to health expenditure fall. Indeed, for the special
case of γ= 0, equation (22) says that labor supply and health expenditure are inversely related
and the latter falls for sure. We conclude based on this, that a rise in aspirations lowers time
investment in health for sure and, possibly, health expenditures. Numerical simulations show
the latter is always true in the parameter space we consider. This is only a partial equilibrium
response since C¯i depends on the consumption distribution. It is important to understand how
the distribution responds in turn and affects equilibrium health and wealth outcomes. The
definition below specifies this equilibrium which is then analyzed numerically in the following
section.
Definition 2. The dynamic general equilibrium of this economy consists of a set of individuals
It who are alive at t = 0,1, . . . ,∞, a consumption distribution {Ci t }i∈It , controls {li t , ai t+1, qi t }
and state variables {θi , ai t , Hi t ,C¯i t } for i ∈It such that
(i) The controls {li t , ai t+1, qi t } represent the optimal solution to (14) subject to (15), given
{Hi t ,C¯i t , ai t ,θi },
(ii) The health stock evolves according to (6) for a given set of optimal controls {li t , ai t+1, qi t }
and Hi t , and
(iii) Aspirations are in equilibrium, that is, the distribution of aspirations {C¯i t } taken as given
for the solution to (14) subject to (15) generates the distribution of optimal consumption
{Ci t }i∈It that is consistent with those aspirations according to (10),
given constant prices {w,R} and the initial distribution of {H0, a0} in the population.
The evolution of It follows the replacement assumption discussed in section 4.3. For now we
note that a deceased individual is replaced by one with different labor productivity and initial
conditions.
4 Aspirations, Health and Inequality
To establish equilibrium relationships between aspirations and health behavior and between
inequality and aggregate health using quantitative methods, wherever possible parameter val-
ues are assigned with an empirical counterpart in mind.
18
4.1 Parameterization
Parameter values are reported in Table 2. Individuals are assumed to start their planning hori-
zon at age 20 which means all life expectancy numbers reported below are conditional on age
20. The length of a period is chosen to be a year, so the discount rate is set to 0.96, similar to
the business cycle literature. The implied return on saving is 4.17% consistent with long-run
US data. The weight on preference for leisure in the utility function, γ, is set to 0.5. The implied
average share of working hours is 0.35, close to the 0.36 implied by McGrattan and Rogerson’s
(2004, Table 1) estimate for 2000 assuming discretionary hours per day to be 16. We follow Car-
roll, Overland, and Weil (1997) in choosing σ = 2. The aspirations parameter ψ is free and in
the baseline set to (σ−1)/σ= 0.5. This implies utility from consumption depends on the ratio
ci /C¯i . Alternative values of ψ are also considered. The depreciation rate of health capital is
taken to be 3% (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2014). Utility from death is normalized to −5000 so that
all households strictly prefer to be alive.14
Parameter Value Description Source
α 0.85 Leisure Parameter in Health Accu-
mulation Equation
Match Life Expectancy Gap of 4.5
between top and bottom deciles
β 0.96 Discount Rate
σ 2 Elasticity of Substitution Carroll, Overland, Weil (1997)
Q 0.195 Health Investment Parameter Match Life Expectancy Gap of 4.5
between top and bottom deciles
τ 0.2 Shape Parameter for Probability of
Survival
Match Life Expectancy Gap of 4.5
between top and bottom deciles
ξ 0.98625 Scalar Parameter for Probability of
Survival
Match Life Expectancy Gap of 4.5
between top and bottom deciles
ν 0.1 Scalar Parameter for Probability of
Survival
Match Life Expectancy Gap of 4.5
between top and bottom deciles
w 20 Wages Scale
Hi 0 Varies Initial Stock of Health
ρ 0.15 Health good Parameter in Health
Production
Match Life Expectancy Gap of 4.5
between top and bottom deciles
γ 0.5 Weight on Leisure Match average share of working
hours
ψ 0.5 Strength of Reference Level of
Consumption
Free
δ 0.03 Depreciation of Health Capital Dalgaard and Strulik (2014)
N 500 Size of the Population Scale
R 1/β Rate of Return on Savings
Table 2: Parameter Values
An individual enters period t with an idiosyncratic labor productivity θ, financial assets a,
14As U becomes more negative, people acquire a greater distaste for death and invest more in health. The ap-
proach we followed is to set U sufficiently low so that people prefer to be alive, then set other parameter values to
match the data.
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health capital H0, and an aspirations level C¯ that constitute the state-vector in his dynamic
programming problem (14). Since capital markets are perfect and complete and there are no
non-convexities, long-run inequality in this economy depends on heterogeneous labor produc-
tivity alone that we refer to as fundamental inequality. The state space Θ for this productivity
is discretized and agents are endowed with productivities ranging from 1 to 20 in increments of
κ= 0.01. The probability/population weights corresponding to the θ’s are chosen from a Pareto
distribution. Since we are interested in tracing the effect of inequality on economic and health
outcomes, we use several combinations of the minimum and shift parameters of the Pareto
distribution.15
Since the initial population size and (exogenous) wage rate are scaling parameters, these
are set arbitrarily. To simulate each individual’s decision problem, he is endowed with an initial
health close to his steady state and initial asset holding of zero. The former is arrived at by
solving the health transition equation (equation (4)) for a given set of policy rules. It ensures that
the simulations are local to the stationary distribution. In particular, since individuals die and
new individuals are introduced into the economy every period to replace them, it is possible
that a non-trivial measure of the agents never get close to their steady-state health and wealth
levels. Starting them at their steady-state health ensures faster convergence. The zero initial
assets assumption, on the other hand, is in keeping with a perfect annuities market where assets
of the deceased are seized by competitive risk-neutral firms.
To make plausible statements about the effect of aspirations on health behavior, we need
to reasonably match life expectancy outcomes. Life expectancy gaps between the rich and the
poor differ substantially in the US and the gap has widened in recent decades (see for example,
Meara et al., 2008 and Olshanksy et al., 2012). We follow Singh and Siahpush (2006) who con-
struct a relative deprivation index based on a number of indicators like education, occupation,
wealth and unemployment, a measure that is strongly correlated with relative income. They re-
port that the life expectancy at birth gap between the highest and lowest socio-economic status
increased from 2.8 years in 1980-82 to 4.5 years in 1998-2000 in the US. Since the simulations
are conducted in steady state, we target the latter number: values for α, ρ, Q, ν, ξ and τ are
picked in order that steady-state life expectancy gap between the top and bottom deciles is 4.5.
It is possible that several other combinations of these parameters also produce a similar life
15Most figures on aggregate inequality use the parameter combination {1.01,1.01}. Since we truncate the upper
tail of the Pareto distribution at 20, we redistribute the remaining weight ω (for θ > 20) over [1,20]. Let x be the
rank of θ in the grid (Θ) over [1,20]. Then x gets assigned a new population weight of G(x)+ω.(x4/L), where L =∑20/κ
1 x
4 is a normalizing constant,κ is the step size of theΘ grid, and G(x) is the probability of drawing productivity
θ(x) from the untruncated Pareto distribution. The exponent on the re-weighting function and the mean of Θ
are chosen to generate levels of inequality that are consistent with observed data. The resulting distribution still
“looks” Pareto – for all of the distributions used in the simulations, the highest weight added to any θ ∈ [1,20] is
0.00013.
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expectancy gap. However, the computational demands of this problem are substantial. So we
fixed α, ρ, and Q in order that health investment was large enough to keep the agent within the
health state space, then varied ν, ξ, and τuntil we achieved the desired gap. The shares of health
time and expenditures in health production, α and ρ, are set at 0.85 and 0.15, respectively. We
have less guidance on these since estimates vary and have a large variance (e.g. Grossman,
1972b).
4.2 Baseline Results
Start with policy rules that map each household’s state vector (θi , ai , Hi ,C¯i ) into his choices
at a point in time. The existence of four state variables makes it difficult to present a policy
rule for all possible realizations.16 Since the objective is to uncover the effect of aspirations
operating through relative consumption, all decisions are plotted against the aspirations gap,
C¯i /ci . Each decision will be presented in three graphs corresponding to health stocks of 9, 10
and 11 units, to give an idea how they differ across health types. Unless otherwise noted, the
individual’s asset, one of the state variables, is set to zero. This does not qualitatively affect
the results presented below but cleanly isolates the role of labor productivity and exogenous
income differences.
Labor Supply and Health Production
Recall the analytical result from section 3 that agents with a larger aspirations gap, C¯i t /ci t , will
unambiguously supply more labor and most likely spend less on the health good. Confirming
that, Figure 2 shows that labor supply is increasing in the aspirations gap across health lev-
els17 and ceteris paribus an increase in labor supply results in lower health. Could individuals
be substituting towards the health good as the aspirations gap rises? Not so: Figure 3 shows
that those with larger aspiration gaps also spend less on the health good. Doing so frees up re-
sources for personal consumption as these individuals attempt to close their aspirations gaps
while the discounted cost, in the form of worse survival, comes in the future. It is clear then
from Figures 2 and 3 that an increase in the aspirations gap results in fewer inputs into health
production, worse health and higher mortality risk. While the existence of the gradient between
health inputs and the aspirations gap is independent of the individual’s health stock, the level
of investment is not. Both figures also show (note differing vertical scale) that, for a given as-
pirations gap, as the individual’s health stock deteriorates – for example if we move from panel
16The policy rules are plotted by calculating the aspirations gap, labor supply, health good, and savings for a
given aspiration level, health stock, and assets.
17Some of the policy functions are not reported for the entire range of the aspirations gap because the gap does
not extend as far for higher productivity individuals who are higher up in the consumption distribution.
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Figure 2: Labor Choice vs Aspirations Gap
Solid: θ = 1, Dashed: θ = 5, Dotted: θ = 15
(c) or (b) to (a) – he invests more in health production through lower labor supply and higher
expenditure on the health good.
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(c) Health Stock: 11
Figure 3: Health Good vs Aspirations Gap by Health Stock
Solid: θ = 1, Dashed: θ = 5, Dotted: θ = 15
Combining the implications of the previous two figures, Figure 4 shows that the individual’s
health stock worsens the larger is his aspirations gap and, controlling for the aspirations gap, he
invests more in health as his health stock falls.
To what extent are these effects due to the conventional effect of absolute income versus
socially-minded behavior? The best way to gauge that is to contrast two cases: the baseline
model (ψ = 0.5) and a version without aspirations (ψ = 0). Figure 5 presents labor supply and
health spending decisions as well as the implied changes in health stock as the aspirations gap
widens. Labor supply, health expenditure and health outcomes strongly respond to relative
consumption when individuals care about their relative position. When they do not, relative
consumption has no health effect, only absolute income matters. The overall effect of aspira-
tions is thus to lower health production, an effect that worsens as one moves down the con-
sumption distribution, that is, for higher C¯i /ci .18
18The truncated Pareto distribution of productivity induces a consumption distribution for which C¯i /ci falls with
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Figure 4: Percent Change in Health Stock
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Figure 5: Aspirations and Health Production
Solid: Baseline, Dashed: No Aspirations
Savings Behavior
Return to the baseline model for the savings decision. Figure 6 shows that as the aspirations
gap increases, the agent chooses to hold less assets. Beyond that, the savings decision exhibits
two interesting patterns. As the health stock declines, first, the gradient between the aspirations
gap and the level of savings gets flatter and second, the absolute amount of savings increases.
This is counter-intuitive since declining health should seemingly cause individuals to substitute
away from financial assets towards the health good and leisure. Assets, however, provide an
opportunity to improve health in the future. By saving, individuals can not only improve their
future health, they can afford higher consumption too. Both enable the individual to move
closer to his aspirations level in the future.19 This of course only highlights that financial saving
is not the sole way to provide for the future, health is an alternative.
Figure 7 plots the relationship between “full investment” and the aspirations gap. The for-
ci .
19The gradient between savings and aspiration gap is positive for the most productive individual in Fig 6(a). This
individual is so productive that it is optimal for him to work and save more in the expectation of improving his
future consumption and health; the higher labor earnings is also spent on the health good, partly restoring current
health.
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Figure 6: Savings vs Aspirations Gap by Health Stock
Solid: θ = 1, Dashed: θ = 5, Dotted: θ = 15
mer is calculated by adding the value of leisure time to health expenditure and financial assets,
that is, as Rai /φi +wθ(1− li )+qi .20 Not surprisingly the relationship between this measure of
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Figure 7: Total Savings vs Aspirations Gap by Health Stock
Solid: θ = 1, Dashed: θ = 5, Dotted: θ = 15
overall investment and the aspirations gap is negative. Notably, comparing Figure 7 to Figure 6,
we see that a large proportion of full investment is allocated towards health; health is evidently
more valuable.
Life Expectancy
Next consider the effect that aspiration has on steady-state life expectancy for an individual.
Since those with the largest aspiration gap invest the least in health, we obviously expect them
to have lower life expectancy. Figure 8 looks at this by contrasting the baseline case of aspi-
rations (ψ = 0.5) with one without (ψ = 0) for the same productivity distribution. The level of
aggregate inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is comparable in the aspirations and
no-aspirations scenarios, 0.45 and 0.43 respectively. Figure 8 shows that being aspirational has
20This is similar to Becker et. al ’s (2005) approach of valuing longevity gains to construct a measure of “full
income”. Our measure is somewhat crude in that it does not control for the utility value of leisure time.
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Figure 8: Life Expectancy at Age 20 vs Aspirations Gap
a health cost. The highest C¯i /ci – the maximum aspirations gap in the figure – differs between
the aspirational and non-aspirational societies; the latter is smaller. In both scenarios, however,
this maximum corresponds to the same least productive individual since the distribution of
productivities is identical. Contrasting this individual’s life expectancy between the two scenar-
ios – a gap of about 3 years – clearly shows the adverse effect aspirations has on health. Another
way this is evident is in the population life expectancy gap. The gap between the lowest and
highest deciles of the consumption ratio C¯i /ci (that is, between the most and least productive
individuals) is 6.87 with aspirations in Figure 8, significantly lower at 5.27 years without.
In summary, these results establish that relative position or consumption deprivation – as
measured by C¯i /ci – has a negative effect on an individual’s health because the greater marginal
valuation placed on personal consumption is met through less investment in health produc-
tion. That higher values of fundamental inequality imply greater aspirations gap in the popu-
lation means that higher inequality could lead to higher life expectancy gaps in the population
and, possibly, lower average life expectancy. A fuller appreciation of these results requires us to
consider the general equilibrium implications.
4.3 Aggregate Implications
A positive measure of individuals die every period and are replaced by an equal number of new
agents each of whom draws his own productivity and starts with initial conditions ai 0 = 0 and
Hi 0 = X (θi ), where X is a function that produces the steady-state level of health for a given
productivity. We check convergence to the stationary distribution by looking at the time paths
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of average consumption, labor, and the Gini coefficient. Typically these three variables reach
stationary values after 100 simulation periods. In what follows each of the simulations were run
for 500 periods with a “burn-in” period of 500 which was dropped from the sample.
An important point to note before proceeding. In the closed-economy Ramsey model with
heterogeneous households, the steady-state wealth distribution requires a well-defined demand
for capital that is introduced through a diminishing returns production function (e.g. García-
Peñalosa and Turnovksy, 2014). Here, as in many open-economy models, the interest rate is
exogenous. To ensure a steady state, open economy models often assume an endogenous dis-
count rate, for example β as a function of consumption or income. In this model the effective
discount rate for any individual i , βΦi , is endogenous. But the perfect annuities market as-
sumption means expected return from saving and consumption smoothing are independent
of Φi . It is possible then for i to accumulate unlimited assets over time. Since the numerical
solution method discretizes the state space for assets over a finite grid, i ’s assets can converge
to the upper bound of that state space in finite time. Were that to happen, eventually the asset
distribution would become degenerate and all income heterogeneity would come from labor
income. In the simulations, however, only a tiny minority of high productivity individuals face
this issue. This is because mortality risk ensures that most individuals die well before reaching
the upper bound of the asset space. Moreover, when an individual dies, he is replaced by one
with no initial assets. Mortality and the replacement assumption together ensure that the vast
majority of agents are in the interior of the state space and the steady-state asset distribution is
non-degenerate.
Is Inequality Motivating?
The first step in identifying the aggregate effect of aspirations is understanding their effect on
equilibrium income and consumption inequality. In other words, how does the consumption
and income inequality that result from aspirational behavior relate to fundamental inequality,
inequality in endowed ability?
Milton Friedman posited in Capitalism and Freedom (1962) that inequality is desirable be-
cause, among other things, it motivates people to strive for something better. Presumably do-
ing so places them in a better position than otherwise. “Doing better”, in turn, can be taken to
mean better in terms of economic outcomes alone or overall welfare. Our model can be used
to test this claim since the aspirations gap – the gap between his personal consumption and as-
pirational consumption – motivates an individual to supply more labor and accumulate more
assets in order to increase income and consumption. Moreover, absent pecuniary externalities
(exogenous prices), aspirational behavior on its own could attenuate fundamental inequality if
this effect is stronger among poorer households.
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We remove health from the model by setting τ= 0 and first study how income for individuals
with differing productivities is altered by upward-looking aspirations. Evidently from Figure 9
(solid lines correspond to best non-linear fits), the drive to catch up motivates people to step up
their labor supply and realize higher steady-state income at all productivity levels.21 But looking
closer, Figure 9 hints at a differential effect of aspirations across poorer and richer individuals –
the latter enjoy higher relative gains.
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Figure 9: Effect of Aspirations on Household Income
To uncover this, Figure 10 compares consumption and income inequality with and with-
out aspirations. Bear in mind that market-generated income inequality is always higher than
fundamental inequality whether or not individuals are aspirational since ability heterogeneity
induces heterogeneity in wealth. The issue is how this market-generated inequality responds
to aspirations. Unlike the previous figure, Figure 10 is produced by exogenously varying in-
equality in the underlying productivity distribution through mean preserving spreads. The solid
black line is the 45o line and the scatter plots use the same underlying productivity distribution
which nevertheless yields different equilibrium levels of consumption/income inequality for
aspirational and non-aspirational economies. For both income and consumption, contrary to
Friedman’s conjecture, inequality under social aspirations is strictly higher.
This must mean social aspirations do not uniformly affect rich and poor households. All
differences in steady-state income from labor and capital arise purely from lifetime labor supply
(recall they all start without any financial assets). So if aspiration prompts highly productive
(richer) individuals to respond more on the labor market than less productive (poorer) ones,
fundamental inequality would be aggravated, not alleviated. Figure 11 studies this possibility
by plotting two labor supply ratios against various levels of fundamental inequality: median
21A comparable analysis for overall welfare – that is, lifetime utility – is infeasible since preferences are different.
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Figure 10: Aspirations and Inequality
Solid: 45◦ Line, Markers: Simulations
labor supply relative to supply by the bottom decile of households (panel a) and labor supply of
the top decile to median labor supply (panel b). Note that this is based on the labor supply, not
consumption, distribution. For example, the top 10% of the labor supply distribution (Figure
11b) corresponds to the bottom 10% of the consumption distribution.
Aspiration, of course, motivates all households to increase their labor supply as we saw ear-
lier. What Figure 11 shows is that this response systematically differs across the productivity
distribution. Without aspirations (blue/plus), there is a greater dispersion in labor supply –
richer individuals supply considerably less at any level of fundamental inequality. Under as-
pirations (black/star), these individuals increase their labor supply more than poorer ones. In
the simulations labor supply of the bottom 10% actually fell relative to the median as inequality
increased. Though richer individuals always supply less labor than poorer ones, the combined
effect of higher productivity and lifetime wealth accumulation is to raise their relative income
and consumption levels.22
22A testable implication of the model with aspirations is that less productive (poorer) individuals supply more
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Figure 11: Relative Labor Supply and Fundamental Inequality
This figure plots the ratio of labor supply of the median and the bottom decile and the top decile and median
against fundamental inequality with and without aspirations
Blue/Plus: No Aspirations, Black/Star: Aspirations
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Figure 12: Mean Relative Consumption Deprivation and Inequality
These implications follow directly from our prior results on the aspirations gap as, for the
equilibrium consumption distribution, higher fundamental inequality corresponds to higher
mean aspirations gap. Figure 12 plots the mean gap – calculated as the population-weighted
sum of C¯i t /ci t – against income and consumption inequality. An increase in either consump-
tion or income inequality is always associated with an increase in the overall aspirations gap or
relative deprivation.23
labor than more productive (richer) ones. Among the employed in the US, those with less than high school edu-
cation worked for 7.96 hours per week in 2013 compared to 7.44 hours for those with bachelor’s degree and higher
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey, Table 4). The relationship by labor earnings is less clear cut
(Table 5). Interestingly, a recent study by the Center for Disease Control (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report,
April 3, 2015) notes a systematic discrepancy even in sleep time, something usually taken to be non-discretionary
in macro-models. In particular, more than 35% of adults below the poverty line enjoyed less than six hours of sleep
per night in 2013. Among those earning more than four times the poverty line, 27.7% did.
23Yitzhak (1979) notes that mean relative deprivation in income is proportional to the income Gini.
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Though inequality is motivating because of upward-looking aspirations, it is so for all house-
holds. We conclude that since richer households have more scope to respond, general equilib-
rium inequality rises. Notably this occurs without credit frictions that distort investment be-
havior across the income distribution or any (health) cost to being aspirational. Credit frictions
would only exacerbate this if they affect the poor disproportionately. And introducing health
costs, as we show next, worsens absolute and relative health of the poor, amplifying the effect
aspirations has welfare.
Inequality as a Health Hazard: The Relative Income Gradient
If aspiration is costly for health production, does it further worsen consumption and income
inequality? Lower health production lowers expected lifetime. Since the value of being alive
falls, it stands to reason that the incentive to catch up, the motivation that inequality provides,
weakens for the poor. But consumption (similar for income) inequality is not unambiguously
higher under health production (Figure 13(a)). An opposing effect is at work. The rich, already
consuming a lot, face sharper diminishing returns from consumption than from health. They
spend disproportionately more on health as Figure 13(b) shows. That means a lower saving and
consumption propensity for them than otherwise. This tends to lower consumption inequality,
though health does have an overall tendency to amplify the effect of fundamental inequality for
low and moderate levels of inequality in Figure 13(a).
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Figure 13: The Effect of Health on Equilibrium Inequality under Aspirations
Consider next how health production depends on household income in general equilib-
rium. In Figure 14(a), we plot simulated data on household steady-state life expectancy (cal-
culated as 1/(1−φ(H))) and income corresponding to four different aspiration parameters,
ψ ∈ {0,0.5,0.5,0.6}, higher values associated with stronger aspirational desires. Each solid line
in the figure corresponds to a nonlinear fit to the data.
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Figure 14: Household Income and Health with and without Aspirations
As the partial equilibrium model of section 2 indicated, regardless of how socially minded
households are, aspirations adversely affect health production. As social aspiration increases,
for instance going from ψ values of 0 to 0.4 versus 0.50 to 0.6, health production and life ex-
pectancy worsen at any income level. The equilibrium relationship between health and income
gets flatter too. As before, the marginal propensity to invest in health is weakend at lower in-
come levels since poorer households face a larger aspirations gap and that raises their marginal
propensity to consume. This result is similar to the effect on saving of inherited taste in de la
Croix and Michel (1999), conspicuous consumption in youth in Corneo and Jeanne (1998) and
consumption-based common aspirations in Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005). Figure 14(b) presents
the absolute and relative change in life expectancy going fromψ= 0 toψ= 0.5 (baseline) at dif-
ferent values of household income. The rich suffer the least in both absolute and relative terms,
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though for sufficiently high income the loss is trivial.24
We return to our prior discussion on how this explains the empirical puzzle on inequality
and health. Note, first of all, the strong concavity of the no-aspirations case in Figure 14. Clearly
mean preserving spreads of the underlying productivity distribution would generate a relatively
strong effect on population life expectancy as we conjectured in section 2. Moreover, as Figure
5 showed, health investment does not respond to relative position under no-aspirations. That
means, the no-aspirations model would not explain the strong micro-level evidence on the rel-
ative income gradient either.
Under aspirations, though the production of health is subject to strong diminishing returns
– healthy time investment has a natural upper bound of unity in (6) effectively making it a con-
straint on health accumulation even if income were to grow without bounds – the overall rela-
tionship between household health and income is weakened by relative position. In Figure 14,
a marginal decrease in household income decreases its health by a relatively small magnitude
if its aspirational motives are strong. This weakening of the effect of income is entirely consis-
tent with the same household responding strongly to relative deprivation as measured by the
consumption gap ci /C¯i in partial equilibrium (recall Figure 4).
A clearer view of how aspiration weakens Jensen’s inequality emerges from Figure 15(a). It
plots model-generated population life expectancy against different values of fundamental in-
equality with and without aspirations. It is produced from the estimated relationships in Figure
14 after ensuring that the curves forψ= 0 andψ= 0.5 yield the same life expectancy at the mean
steady-state income level; this is to control for the level difference in Fig 14 since the model is
not being recalibrated for ψ= 0. We see that exogenous increase in fundamental inequality has
a weaker effect, though still negative, on average life expectancy. We erred on the side of being
conservative in picking ψ = 0.5 for the baseline case since we do not have direct estimates of
it. A sufficiently high value can weaken the negative relationship to insignificance. Hence, if
households are aspirational, it may be hard to consistently observe the negative consequences
of inequality from aggregate health statistics. Measures of health inequality, on the other hand,
are more informative about the consequences of income inequality. In Figure 15(b), higher
fundamental inequality strongly raises inequality of health outcomes.
The model also explains why the aggregate relationship between health and inequality has
weakened in recent decades. Two obvious explanations are economic growth and medical im-
provements. Looking again at Table 1, the sub-sample shows that after 2000 income growth had
a significant effect on life expectancy, so it could be that increases income are causing the weak-
24This cannot be seen from the figure directly. Because aspirations induce agents to pursue higher income and
consumption, the equilibrium distributions of income can differ between ψ = 0 and ψ = 0.5. Specifically the
baseline case will exhibit a wider range of incomes for the same underlying distribution of productivity.
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Figure 15: Health and Inequality
ening relationship. We simulate the model economy by varying the wage rate to 10 and 30 from
the baseline value of 20.25 We find that increasing income decreases the gradient between life
expectancy and inequality. This is obvious from the regression results produced from the sim-
ulated data and reported in Table 3: an increase in the wage rate weakens the negativity of the
inequality-life expectancy gradient. One would, of course, expect higher income to raise health
expenditure and healthy time investment. There is, however, a biological constraint on how
much that can raise life expectancy (upper bound on φ). Therefore the impact of a uniform
increase income will be weaker in those economies with already high life expectancy/low in-
equality than those with low life expectancy/high inequality. The negative effect of GDP growth
post-2000 in Table 3 could have to do with how widely those income gains have been shared;
25In comparison to the baseline, a wage of 30 represents an 52% increase in GDP, while a wage of 10 represents a
54% reduction. Though the wage rate w and aggregate return to capital r are constant in this model, this approach
is similar to what one would do in a closed-economy under a Cobb-Douglas technology like BK εL1−ε. In steady
state, an increase in TFP B would increase the wage rate leaving unchanged the return to capital.
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in practice, labor earnings have stagnated suggesting that GDP growth was associated with a
worsening of the aspirations gap for the lower tail of the distribution.
Inequality (Gini)
w = 10 Income −6.755∗∗∗
(-8.73)
Consumption −7.364∗∗∗
(-8.646)
w = 20 Income −6.11848∗∗∗
(-7.769)
Consumption −6.804∗∗∗
(-7.758)
w = 30 Income −6.152∗∗∗
(-7.311)
Consumption −6.51∗∗∗
(-7.328)
t-stats in parentheses, significance levels: ***: 1%, **:5%, *:10%
Table 3: Model: Life Expectancy and Inequality
A second possibility for the weakening correlation is changes in health production. For in-
stance, improvement in medical science or access to medical care can yield better health from
a given set of inputs. A simple way to test this is to increase health productivity Q; we consider
outcomes under Q = 0.195 (baseline) relative to Q = 0.2925 for the same baseline wage of 20.
The higher value of Q raises life expectancy to be sure, but also weakens the correlation be-
tween income and health. The slope coefficient goes from −6.804 to −6.080 for consumption
inequality, from −6.118 to −5.601 for income inequality as Q increases. This makes intuitive
sense: a higher Q increases the marginal benefits of healthy time investment and health expen-
diture for those with lower life expectancy (income) who are already supplying labor close to
their maximum potential. The differential effect on poorer households relative to richer ones
can lessen the erosive effects of inequality.
These household-level results on the aspirations gap and health outcomes and aggregate-
level results on inequality and overall life expectancy or life expectancy inequality may also arise
under income-based aspirations. For example, if people cared about relative income because
of upward-looking aspirations, then given his financial wealth, the only way an individual can
raise his present income is by supplying more labor. That comes at the cost of less time in health
production. This is also true in our model except that those income gains are valued only to the
extent they helped raise relative consumption and, as we saw in the simulations, health spend-
ing also fell. If people cared about relative income, on the other hand, their higher earnings
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would be valued directly as well as functionally. Health spending would rise as long as health
is a normal good and that would tend to substitute for the missing health time investment. As
long as time and health expenditure are not too substitutable, overall health production would
suffer. Similar results can be obtained under wealth-based aspirations. The important point is
that as long as aspirations are formed on the basis of non-health goods or outcomes, there is a
trade-off between being aspirational and being healthy.
We should also point out that not all our results require heterogeneous aspirations. Take
common aspirations with respect to mean consumption as in many papers with KUWJ pref-
erences. Households below the mean have a positive aspirations gap, the gap increasing the
poorer a household is. The qualitative response to the aspirations gap among these households
would be similar: higher labor supply, higher income, lower health production than without
aspirations. Households above the mean, on the other hand, have a negative aspirations gap.
Deriving “pride” from their relative success, they would supply less labor, earn less income and
realize better health than otherwise. In this world, aspiration has the effect of attenuating, not
amplifying, fundamental inequality. How motivating aspirations is thus depends on how it is
specified across the distribution.
Upward-looking aspirations seem a more plausible description of human behavior than
common aspirations. The idea that the poor and the rich both desire the same standard of liv-
ing contradicts what we observe, more so in light of recent media reports on attitudes towards
rising inequality.26 Despite spectacular income growth among the top 1-5% of households in
the US over the last thirty years, researchers have observed among them a lingering feeling of
not being rich, of being “middle class”. One explanation is that the sharp divergence of incomes
within this group itself has caused status anxiety as the rich and the super-rich constantly com-
pare their lives with those doing even better. Of course, pursing upward-looking aspirations in
our model (negligibly) worsens the health of the rich which, depending on one’s perspective,
may seem counterfactual. In reality, the rich are better equipped to redress this through better
healthcare and production technologies.
5 Conclusion
We developed a model of upward-looking aspirations and demand for health to study the effect
of inequality. The model showed that relative deprivation within a reference group is an impor-
tant determinant of mortality. In addition, it showed that even though social aspirations can
be motivating, income and consumption inequality are worsened since poorer households are
26For example, Catherine Rampall: “Rich People still don’t realize they’re Rich”, Economix, New York Times, April
19, 2011, and Graeme Wood: “Secret Fears of the Super-Rich”, The Atlantic, April 2011.
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limited by how much they can respond to those aspirations. When households invest in health,
this worsening inequality is accompanied by another welfare cost, worsening absolute and rel-
ative health for poorer households. Finally, we provided an explanation for why the correlation
between inequality and life expectancy at the aggregate level is weak and possibly declining
over time.
In analyzing the effect of aspirations on household behavior, we assumed for tractability
that all households are aspirational. Since not meeting one’s aspirations, “aspirations failure”,
lowers utility, not everyone may choose to be aspirational. Typically we would see this among
the poorest households who psychologically opt out of the rat race (Barnett et al., 2010) or
choose not to make investments that raise their relative income (Genicot and Ray, 2010). Non-
aspirational behavior would obviously neutralize the effect that aspirations has on health pro-
duction. Since lack of aspirations lowers household income, their health would suffer still be-
cause of the conventional absolute income gradient. How inequality affects the decision to be
aspirational and how adversely health is affected by that decision are topics for further research.
Another useful extension to this paper would be to explore the role of policy. Redistributive tax-
ation or health investment subsidies similar to de la Croix and Michel (1999) can improve health
outcomes by making individuals feel relatively less deprived. Similarly public health provision,
by lowering the shadow price of health for poorer households, would be a way to contain the
social cost of inequality and aspirations failure.
Though our primary focus has been inequality in the developed economies, the theory may
be applied more generally. In recent work, Bernard et al. (2014) conduct an interesting field
experiment among rural Ethiopian households. Subjects were shown documentaries on peo-
ple like them who became successful through conscious choice. The same subjects surveyed
subsequently showed a new emphasis on forward-looking behavior such as savings and credit
demand. The implication of this for effecting change among the very poor, mired as they are in
a trap of poverty and lack of aspirations, is powerful. But we should be cautious in viewing aspi-
rations as a development tool more broadly. Set aside the concern that engendering aspirations
in societies where opportunities are limited can lead to disappointment and social strife. If pur-
suing one’s aspirations is associated with direct economic and non-economic costs – the loss of
health is just one example – then such a policy may not unambiguously improve the quality of
life.
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Appendix
In an interior optimum the household equates the marginal cost and benefit from the two types
of health investment, q and 1− l , respectively:
(1−α)Qq−α(1− l )α
[
v + (c/C¯ )
1−σ
1−σ
]
= (1+H) c
−σ
C¯ 1−σ
,
αQq1−α(1− l )α−1
[
v + (c/C¯ )
1−σ
1−σ
]
=w(1+H) c
−σ
C¯ 1−σ
.
It follows that healthy time and health good investment are linearly related, 1− l = [α/(1−
α)]q/w . Using this, rewrite the budget constraint as c = wl + a˜ − q = w + a˜ − q/(1−α). Op-
timal health expenditure is then the implicit solution to
αα(1−α)1−αQcσ
[
vC¯ 1−σ+ c
1−σ
1−σ
]
= (1+H)wα
with c given by the equation above and H =Q[α/(1−α)]αw−αq . Straightforward differentiation
shows that
∂q
∂w
=
(1−α)
(
−νQ(σ−1)σ
(
C¯
c
)1−σ+Q+ ( α1−α)1−α (σ−1)wα−1)
Q
(
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c
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∂
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QwC¯
(
(σ−2)
(
c
C¯
)1−σ+ν(σ−1)σ)3 < 0
It is tedious but straightforward to show that (details available upon request) q(w) is convex,
that is, q ′′(w)> 0. That is, as in Hall and Jones (2007), health spending is a luxury good. Straight-
forward differentiation also shows that H(w) and Ψ(w) are both increasing and concave func-
tions (details available upon request).
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